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SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil
In No.

Timely

81-2337, the United States contends

-

::l -

by the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations.

In No. 82-132, '

North Dakota contends that federal jurisdiction is proper under
other statutes not containing limitations periods.
2.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

The United States owns

land along the Little Missouri River in North Dakota, and claims

---

.

title to the riverbed as a riparian landowner.

Since 1955, the

United States has issued oil and gas leases on the riverbed.
1978, North Dakota
132;

hereafter

officials

(petrs

(resp in No. 81-2337

resp)

brought

in No.

suit

81-2337

&

cross-petr in No. 82-

against

various

cross-resps

&

In

federal

in No.

82-132;

hereafter petrs), seeking an injunction prohibiting petrs from
exercising ownership over the riverbed and a declaration that the
....· .,
riverbed belonged to resp.
The complaint asserted that the
t/L i ttle Missouri River had been
admitted
thereupon

to

statehood,

vested

in

§§1331

u.s.

complaint ~lleged
(fe deral

(declaratory

The DC

title
the

to

the

riverbed

"equal footing"

had

doctrine,

1 (1894).
federal jurisdiction under 28

question),

judgment) ,

Procedure Act).

that

resp under

Shively v. Bowlby, 152
The

and

~ble at the time resp was

and

1361
5 U.S .c.

(mandamus),
§701-7 06

(D.ND; Van Sickle)

u.s.c.

2201-2202

(Administrative

held that the only

basis for jurisdiction was the Quiet Title Act, 28

.

u.s.c.

§2409a,

and directed that the complaint be ~ dismissed unless resp amended
the jurisdictional allegations.
Petr

contended

at

trial

Resp did so.
that

the

river

had

not

been

navigable at the time of .statehood, and that resp' s action was
barred by the Quiet Title Act's 12-year statute of limitations,

- 3 -

28

u.s.c.

The ~C

§2409a (f).

held

that

the

river

had been

navigable, and that the statute of limitations did not apply to a
suit brought by a "sovereign" with respect to "trust lands held
in its s7
The

reign capacity."
CAB

affirmed,

on

the

ground

that

a

statute

of

limitations applies to a sovereign state only if the statute
expressly so states or if the legislative intent was to make the
statute applicable to the sovereign.
Commissioners, 85 U.S. 57 (1873).
28

u.s.c.

Weber v. Board of Harbor

The statute of limitations in

§2409a(f) does not expressly mention actions brought by

states, nor does the legislative history contain any reference to
states.

Since resp is a sovereign state, §2409a(f) cannot apply

to bar its action.
The CA noted that §2409a is a waiver of sovereign immunity
by the United States, and a waiver of immunity ordinarily can be
conditioned on restrictions such as the limitations period.
CA characterized

the

issue

as

The

"a conflict between sovereign

immunity doctrines." The conflict should be resolved in favor of
the state, because its interest in quieting title to public trust
lands is great and Congress has the option of amending §2409a if
it wishes the statute of limitations to apply to states.
The YcA also affirmed

the DC's

finding of navigability.

Since the statute of limitations had been found inapplicable, the
CA did not reach the .issue of whether resp' s original allegations
of jurisdiction had been sufficient.
3.

CONTENTIONS

No. 81-2337:

Petr contends that the §2409a (f) statute of

·'

- 4 limitations applies, by its terms, to "[a]ny civil action under
this section"

(emphasis by petr).

The United States may be sued

only with its consent, and any conditions it chooses to put on
its

consent

limitations

are

binding

on

may

ordinarily

the
not

While

courts.
apply

to

statutes

of

brought

by

suits

sovereign states, this rule has no application when the suit is
against

the

national sovereign.

The CAB's decision conflicts

with United States v. Louisiana, 127 U.S. 182, 192
States v.

(1888)~

442,978 Square Feet of Land, San Francisco, 445 F.2d

1180, 1187-88
F.Supp. 208

(CA9 1971)

and California v. United States, 132

~

(Ct.Cl. 1955), all of which held general statutes of

limitations applicable to states.

The decision also conflicts

with Park County, Montana v. United States, 626 F.2d 718
cert.

United

denied,

449

u.s.

1112

(1981),

which

held

(1980),

§2409a(f)

applicable t~ quiet title action brought by a county.
Resp contends that statutes of limitations do not apply to
.

~

suits brought by states, unless states are specifically mentioned
in the statute.

This principle is particularly important where,

as here, the state is suing in its sovereign capacity to protect
its title to public trust lands.
navigable

waters

is

a

basic

Title to submerged lands under

attribute

of

state

sovereignty,

guaranteed by the Constitution under the equal footing doctrine.
h

regon

v. Corvallis Sand

&

Gravel Co.,

429

u.s.

363

There is no conflict with the cases cited by petr.
involved a suit by a county, not a sovereign state.

(1977).

Park County
The other

cases involved suits for money damages, not quiet title actions
to

preserve

public

trust

lands.

Finally,

application

of

- 5 -

§2409a(f) to bar resp's suit would violate the Tenth Arndt because '
it would impair an attribute of state sovereignty.
No. 82-132:

In its conditional cross-petn, resp contends

that the DC had jurisdiction under 28

u.s.c. §1331 to enter a

declaratory judgment respecting the navigabi 1 i ty of the Little
Missouri River.
is navigable.

Petrs have ., now conceded that the Little Missouri
t

This being the case, title vests indefeasibly in

resp and no quiet

title action is necessary.

Petrs have no

authority to exercise ownership rights over the riverbed, and can
be enjoined under 5 U.S.C. §702 (the judicial review provision of
the APA).

Sovereign immunity is waived under

§702.

In any

event, sovereign immunity could not bar a suit such as this one,
in which a state in its sovereign capacity is seeking to protect
~

its public trust lands.
Petrs
Missouri's
riverbed.

contend

that

navigability,

they
and

have
they

not
still

conceded
claim

Resp's argument is "wholly circular."

the

title

Little
to

the

The actions of

which resp complains are contrary to law only if resp owns the
riverbed.
turns.

Title to the riverbed is the issue on which this case

Thus, the action can be brought only under the Quiet

Title Act.
4.

general

DISCUSSION:
rule

that

The CA' s

waivers

construed strictly.

of

decision runs contrary to the
sovereign

immunity

are

to

be

Under the Quiet Title Act, the United States

has waived its immunity to suit subject to the condition that the
suit be brought within 12 years.

'·

Although statutes of limitation

are ordinarily inapplicable to suits by a state,

the policy

- 6 -

behind this rule (that a state's rights should not be lost due to
a

state

official's

negligence

in

failing

to

bring

suit)

is

inapplicable when the suit is brought against the United States.
The United States

could

have

prevented

the

state

from

suing

altogether, if it had chosen not to waive its sovereign immunity.
The fact that it has chosen to waive its immunity within certain
limits should not give the state any right to sue beyond those
limits.

~eneral

statutes of limitations have been held applicable in

suits brought by states against the United States.
v.

Louisiana,

supra:

United States v.

United States

442,978 Square Feet of

Land, San Francisco, supra: California v. United States, supra.
In United States v. Louisiana and United States v. 442,978 Square
· "------"

Feet,

the

courts

assumed

that

statutes

of

limitations

were

applicable and did not discuss the fact that the parties bringing
suit were sovereign states.

The court in California v. United

States also did not discuss the issue, but cited United States v.
Louisiana

for

the

proposition that the statute of limitations

applied even when the plaintiff was a state.
As

in this

case,

.

the

states

in United States v.

442,978

Square Feet and California v. United States were claiming title
to submerged lands · which the United States also claimed.

The

r

states had sought compensation under the Tucker Act rather than
'
bringing quiet title actions, however.
Resp distinguishes the

.

\

cases

on

this · ground,

reasoning

that

states

have

a

special

interest in protecting their title to public trust lands.
Resp's

..

distinction

is

somewhat

tenuous,

since

the

state

- 7 plaintiffs in the prior cases were also trying to establish their '
title to land.
address,
Petr

it may be more appropriate to wait for a future case.

points out

statute of
courts.

Although the issue is one the Court may wish to

that

a

limitations

A square

number
issue

of cases raising

the §2409a (f)

are currently pending

conflict may

develop

through

one

in federal
of

these

cases, or the CAs may carve out a special rule for statutes of
limitations
involve

in

quiet

different

title

statutes

cases.
of

Because
limitations

the

prior

and

may

cases
be

distinguishable, I recommend denial in No. 81-2337.
Even if the Court is interested in granting No. 81-2337, I
recommend denial in No.

82-132.

The CA did not address resp's

jurisdictional arguments, and resp would be free to raise them
again before the CA if this Court were to reverse on the statute
of limitations issue.

There are responses in Nos. 81-2337 and No. 82-132.

I recommend denial in both cases.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

~

~ C:0-4- Ml
9:..

No. 81-2337:~

~

Block v. North Dakota¢4<. 4 .Jc~t.,_J-rv-5' ~
From:

~

Mark

Februa!],_ 5

y-_1~~3. L

~1-9~~

141'4.. s~ tv .k-.u. •61'-~
Questions Presented
.

~ ~~~~riA~

~

~

Whether a St a t e ' s act1on
·
·
·
U-. <',
to qu1et
t1tle~t
the

Un1ted States is subject to the 12-year statute of limitations in
the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409(f).

r

~~ ~~. 54!.-e jJ~s lrfo~ ~

~v~.

2.

I. Background
A. Statutory Background
Title

28

U.S.C.

§2409a

permits

suit

against

the

United

States "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which
the United States claims an interest."

The important provision

in this case is §2409a(f), which provides:
"Any civil action under this section shall
be barred unless it is commenced within twelve
years of the date upon which it accrued. Such
action shall be deemed to have accrued on the
date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim
of the United States."

B. Facts and Decisions Below
This case involves a dispute as to the ownership of the bed
of the Little Missouri River in North Dakota.
along

the river,

asserts

The US owns land

title to the river bed as a

riparian

landowner, and since at least 1955 has issued oil and gas leases
on the river bed.
this

issuance of

In 1978 North Dakota brought this suit to stop
leases.

The State claims

that

the river was

navigable in 1889, when North Dakota became a state, and therefore that it has title to the river bed under the equal-footing
doctrine.
The State asserted
(federal question), 28

u.s.c.

§702 (APA).

jurisdiction based on

u.s.c.

28

u.s.c.

§1331

§2201 (declaratory judgment), and 5

The US claimed that the correct jurisdiction-

al statute was the Quiet Title Act,

28

u.s.c.

§2409a. 1

The DC

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

''

' ~

3.

(D. ND, Van Sickll.) agreed that the suit could be mainta{ned
only under §2409a, and it made the State amend its complaint to
assert

juri sd ict ion on

this statute.

But

the DC rejected

the

US's argument that the quiet title action was barred because it
had not been brought within the 12-year
forth

in §2409a(f}.

On the merits,

p~ od

of limitations set

the DC held that the river

---------.

was navigable in 1889 and therefore that title should be quieted
in the State.

~ firmed.
Judges

Gibson

occurrit regi
utes

of

against

District Judge Larson

and

Bright,

("time does n9t r!:n

limitations
a

followed

and

sovereign.

laches

The

court

(D. Minn.},

the

-

rule

nullum

again~ ":._. the _~.ing"}

defenses
thought

may
the

joined by

not
rule

tempus

that statbe

asserted

particularly

important here, because North Dakota was asserting title to publie trust lands, which title is a basic attribute of state sovereignty.

This

"great"

interest

justified overriding

the normal

rule of strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity by
the

us.

(Since it affirmed jurisdiction under §2409a,

CA8 did

not decide the State's cross-appeal from the DC's rejection of
the claim under §1331.}

CA8 then affirmed on the merits, though

stating that "we feel that the evidence in the record concerning

-

navigability is rather thin."

(Pet. at 13a.}

1 As the US notes, it is more accurate to say that
jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. §1346, and that the waiver of
~
sovereign immunity comes from §2409a.
I will not make this
distinction throughout this memo, but rather simply will refer to
§2409a.

t

'

.~

4.

w~~~~-~
The Court granted cert.

No action has been taken on re~p's

conditional cross-petition, No. 82-132, which argues that jurisdiction properly rests on §1331 and the APA.
been filed by the State of Colorado, and by

Amicus briefs have
~other

states in a

joint brief.

II. Discussion
At first

blush this case seems to require a simple choice

between two rules of construction that are in conflict:

{1) the

rule that US waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed
strictly,

and

{2)

the rule that statutes of limitations do not

apply to sovereigns absent express intent.

It turns out, though,

that the issue is more complex, as it requires consideration of

--

whether the federal sovereign immunity applies at all

-

by a state to quiet title to river beds.

-------

t~

suit

A. Applicability of §2409a{f) to a State
Section 2409a{f) 's 12-year limitation applies to "any" action brought to quiet title.
exempt states

Clearly Congress did not expressly

from this condition.

In a normal case the plain

language would control.

~

~

.,.-

There are two complicating factors.
doctrine

~+~t

----

--

First, the longstanding

:::....

a statute of limitations does not run against a

sovereign unless the sovereign is "expressly designated, or nee'--

-..

'\

essarily included by the nature of the mischiefs to be remedied."
Weber v.

Board of Harbor Commissioners,

~This ex~ption

does

not_ap~ere,

85

u.s.

57,

70

{1873).

as there is nothing in the

5.

statute or legislative history suggesting that Congress expreisly
meant to apply §2409a(f} to states.
fore, North Dakota wins.

Under this doctrine, there-

But there is yet another doctrine, that
-'

of strict construction of waivers of

immunity by the

u.s.

e.g., United states v. Mitchell, 445

us.

535, 538 (1980}.

~ee,

Under

this doctrine the US wins, since §2409a(f} -- a condition on the
waiver

of

sovereign

immunity

does

not

expressly

exclude

states.
Which doctrine should control?

There is little precedent.

Apart from CAS's decision below, ?nly one court has held that a
~

federal

statute of

state against the

limitations does

us.

not apply to a

suit by a

See California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n

v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36

(ND Cal 1981}.

cases,

that have applied statutes of

though still only a

few,

limitations to state plaintiffs.

For example,

There are more

in Park County,

Montana v. United States, 626 F.2d 718 (CA9 1980}, CA9 stated, in
a case brought by a county, that
"this case involves a federal statute of limitations in a suit against the United States in
federal forum.
Such statutes of limitation
are generally applicable to governmental entities as well as individuals.
See United
States v. Louisiana, 127 U.S. 182, 185, 192
(1888}; California v. United States, 132 F.
S u pp. 2 0 8 ( Ct . C1. 19 55} . " 6 2 6 F . 2 d at 7 2 0 .
See also Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1280
denied, 442

u.s.

941 (1979}

(CAS 1978}, cert.

(case brought city}; United States v.

422,978 Square Feet of Land, 445 F.2d 1180 (CA9 1971}.
That is it -- just this handful of cases on the subject.

--------

I

am inclined to agree with the "majority" view that the limitations

p~riod

applies to....--....__
state plaintiffs.

My reasons are two-

6.

fold.

First,

'
the nullum tempus occurrit regi rule, though per-

prerogati~e

haps "a vestigial survival of the

of the Crown, . . .

is supportable now because its benefit and advantage extend to
every citizen,

including the defendant, whose plea of laches or

limitation it precludes."
304

u.s.

126,

Guaranty Trust Co.

132

(1938).

public

expense

The

rule

United States,

prevents a defendant from

gaining

at

agents.

But this rationale seems inapplicable when there are two

"public

interests"

States

is

the

in

because

v.

the case,

defendant

seeking

of

the

negligence of

as

there are when

to

vindicate a

state

the United

federal

(i.e,

"public") interest by raising a statute of limitations defense.
Second, the US's sovereign immunity applies even to states,
i.e., a state may not sue the US without its consent.
California v.

Arizona,

440

u.s.

59,

61-62

(1979).

See, e.g.,
This means

that the US could have prevented North Dakota from bringing this

-

---------~~-------~-----------------------------

suit --or, in other words, that in this conflict between sover-

-

e igns the US has the ultimate power.

Given this,

if the US re-

!axes its immunity by permitting a state to sue, there seems no
logical

justification for

failing

strict construction of the waiver.

to apply

the normal

rule of

Applying a statute of limita-

tions to a state does not seem to be an intrusion on state sovereignty given that the state could be barred from suit altogether.

B. Does the US have Immunity from a State's Suit to Quiet Title?
The states'
premise.

response to the above argument is to deny its

They do not argue primarily about whether the waiver of

sovereign immunity should be strictly construed, but rather argue

7.
that there is no sovereign immunity here at all.

That is, b'o th

resp and the state amici urge strongly that even in the absence
of the Quiet Title Act the US could

--------

kota from bringing this suit.
<.,

prevented North Da-

Here is how the state amici make

the argument:

(i) Each of the original 13 states retained as an essential
element of sovereignty the title to the bed of any navigable water in its boundaries.

Under the

11

~al foot~ d~c~rg,

this

rule applies to all states as of the date of their admission to
the Union.

This is the basis on which North Dakota claims title

to the bed of the Little Missouri River.
(ii) Because these public trust lands are an essential element of state sovereignty,
tions

in which

11

[t]his is one of those rare situa-

the doctrine of

sovereign

immunity

is

rendered

inapplicable by the very nature of the constitutional compact.
Brief for 28 States as Amici at 12.
a

waiver

of

state would

sovereign
be

immunity

foreclosed

11

Under the US's view, absent

(i.e. ,

entirely

I

the Quiet Title Act)

from challenging

claim of ownership to the bed of a navigable river.

a

a

federal

Whatever the

validity of otherwise prohibiting a state from suing the Federal
Government absent consent, such a result cannot be permitted when
the state asserts title to land based on the Constitution itself.
(iii)
suit,

Given that the Constitution itself would permit this

there would be grave constitutional problems if the Quiet

Title Act permitted a

state's claim of title to sovereign sub-

merged lands to be lost by mere passage of time.

At the least,

.:,·

·~

''•

.
-· .

8.
therefore,

the

Court

that result where,
tent.

should

as here,

not

assume

that

Congress

intended

there is no express legislative in-

It is noteworthy that the US contends that North Dakota

should have known of the US's claim since 1955. 2

This means that

the suit was barred as of 1967 -- yet the Quiet Title Act was not
enacted until 1972.

This would mean that Congress retroactively

(::::'

abolished
barred.

a

claim

that

previously

could

not

have

been

time

The Court should construe the Quiet Title Act to avoid

these constitutional problems, and thus should hold that §2409(f)
does not apply to states.

I am sympathetic toward this argument.

In United States v.

Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892), the Court held that it had original jurisdiction in a boundary suit brought by the Federal Gov-

ernment (on behalf of a Territory) against a state.

Justice Har-

lan's opinion stated that the Framers "could not have overlooked
the possibility that controversies, capable of judicial solution,
might arise between the United States and some of the States, and
that the permanence of the Union might be endangered if to some
tribunal was not entrusted the power to determine them according
to the recognized principles of law."
more,

although

Id. at 644-645.

a State normally must consent to be

Further-

sued by an

individual,

2 The US observes that the lower courts assumed, but did
not decide, that North Dakota "knew or should have known" of the
claim since 1955. Thus, if the US prevails here, a remand is in
order on this factual question.

I

•;ry: ~
'

'

.-

9.
"[t]he question as to the suability of one
government by another government rests upon
wholly different grounds . . . . The submission
to judicial solution of controversies arising
between these two governments, 'each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to
it, and neither sovereign with respect to the
objects committed to the other,' McCulloch v.
Marx land, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 00, 410, but both
subJect to the supreme law of the land, does
no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty. .
[C]onsent [to be sued] was given
by Texas when admitted into the Union."
Id.
at 646.
This reasoning would apply,
against

I

think,

the United States concerning title to submerged lands.

It does no violence to the sovereignty of
state

to a suit by a state

to

bring

a

suit

to determine

the US

to permit a

whether certain

lands are

those that were specifically retained by the state upon entering

-------

the Union.

___

There is, however, a dispositive reply: the states' argument
.

comez

_....__-~_....

too late in the day.

In California v. Arizona,

440 U.S.

59, 61-62 (1979), Justice Stewart stated for a unanimous Court:
"It is well settled that the United States
must give its consent to be sued eyeo wRen one
of the - states i~this Court's original
juri~

'It does not follow that because a State
may be sued by th~ United States without
its consent, therefore th~ bnited States
may be sued by a State without its consent. Public policy forbids that conclusion. Kansas v. United States, 204
u.s. 331, 342. I
See Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 387 (dicta).
But cf. United States v. Brown, 143 U.S. 621."
/

California

v.

Arizona

was

a

suit

identical

to

this one:

California wanted to quiet title to a riverbed claimed under the

6::--

10.

equal-footing doctrine, where the United States claimed title as
The Court stated flatly · that "if the United

riparian owner.

States has not consenfed to be sued in an action such as this,
California's
denied."

motion

for

Id. at 62.

leave

to

file

a

complaint

must

be

(It also is noteworthy that United States

v. Texas, upon which the states must rely, was dismissed with a
"but cf." cite.)
The state amici are correct that California v. Arizona did
not consider the constitutional issue in the terms raised in this
case.

They also are correct that the

~ntire

doctrine of US immu-

nity from suit by a state has not been well explained; the controlling precedent, Kansas v. United States, simply stated that
"public policy forbids [the] conclusion" that states may sue the
US without its consent.

l

Nonetheless,

See 204

u.s.

at 342.

as Justice Stewart said,

~ been cons ide red "well settled."

this

rule has long

Over turning it would require a

repudiation of numerous cases in which states have not been
mitted to sue the

us.

It would

also require

repudiating

9h]i::;.

per~
the

1-p

unanimous opinion in California v. Arizona, which expressly stat- ~
ed that the Quiet Title Act's waiver of sovereign immunity was

w~

essential to the state's ability to bring the suit.
In sum,

I think that under the Court's decisions the US's

sovereign immunity extends to a state suit to quiet title to sub-

-----

merged lands.

~

North Dakota's suit must rest on a waiver of sov-

ereign immunity.

And, as discussed earlier, I think that since

the Federal Government thus has complete power to prevent such a
suit, any waiver of immunity should be strictly construed.

....

The

,.;

,,

11.
12-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act therefore 'applies to state plaintiffs.

C. Alternative Jurisdictional Grounds
CA8 ruled only that §2409a permits this suit.

The Court has

not acted on the State's conditional cross-petition, No. 82-132,
which

raises

the

question

whether

the

suit

could

brought under other federal statutory provisions.

have

been

Normally such

an issue would be left for CA8 on remand.
Resp continues to press this argument, however, and the SG
is so confident that the argument is meritless that he now in-

~--~---------------------------------vites
the Court to decide
it. See Brief for US at 13 n.9. Moreove? : the cross=-Peti tion- is virtually identical to North Dakota's
brief

in this case.

Finally,

if the Court rejects the State's

argument that it has a constitutional right to sue the US in this
type of case, independent of the Quiet Title Act, it necessarily
rejects the State's primary ground for
proper

jurisdictional basis

for

arguing that §1331 is a

the suit.

Since the State

is

defending this suit largely on the basis of the existence of alternative grounds for jurisdiction, the Court may wish to consid-------------------~

er granting the cross-petition.
\

' - Th ere
ed.

are~~ tion~l i ~that

First, the State asserts that "the issue of navigability is

a federal question" under §1331.
true,

see United States v.

irrelevant.

..

Brief for resp at 28.

Oregon,

295

u.s.

1,

14

This is

(1935),

but

This is a suit not to determine navigability, but to

determine ownership.

\

would need to be decid-

That

the

complaint

suggests

the

need

to

12.
decide the federal question whether the Little Missouri River was
navigable does not have any bearing on
from the suit.

wh~ther

the US is immune

North Dakota must find a waiver of sovereign im-

munity somewhere,

and under my analysis the only source is the

Quiet Title Act -- with its statute of limitations.
The State's other argument is that the suit may be based on
5

u.s.c.

North Dakota brought this

§702.

suit against

federal

officials, rather than the US itself, and claims that "the actual
title to property is not in dispute; that is merely incidental to
the

real dispute

[the federal officials']

interference with

the State's right to use and enjoy sovereign public trust land."
Brief for Resp at 34.

This is nonsense.

Onwership was decided

only in this very suit; if this is not a suit to quiet title, no
such thing exists.

I find it ridiculous for North Dakota to try

to make this into a case of "unauthorized action of a few executive branch officers seeking to assert federal authority over the
bed of a navigable river."

Brief for resp at 28.

This is a suit

against the US.

III. Conclusion
CAS should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for
II

II

findings as to when North Dakota knew or should have known that
'-----::,

the US asserted ownership.

-

This will determine whether the suit

is barred by §2409a(f) 's 12-year limitation.

The Court also may

wish to remand for consideration whether this suit may be brought
under §1331 or the APA,

though the Court perhaps should simply

decide these issues here .

..
··'
-;

13.

(1} In the conflict between the doctrine of strict construetion of waivers of sovereign immunity and the doctrine of nullum
tempus

occurrit

regi,

the

strict

construction

doctrine

should

prevail.
(a}

The nullum tempus rule's justification -- that the

public should be protected

~-

..---

does not have the same force when

,

the public is represented on
(b)

-

both - ~ides

of the suit.

---------------- -- -----......___

Since the US could bar the State's suit entirely,
_.,.

it is logical to apply the strict construction rule when the US
-----------~-----

waives its immunity to permit a State to sue.
(2} The State's argument that the US is not immune in cases
involving title to submerged lands is· foreclosed by this Court's
prior cases.

It " is "well settled" that the US must consent to

all suits by states as well as by individuals.
(3} There is no merit in the State's argument that this suit
may be brought under §1331 or the APA.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 81-2337

AND

82-132

JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, ET
AL., PETITIONERS

81-2337

v.

NORTH DAKOTA, EX REL. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY
AND SCHOOL LANDS
NORTH DAKOTA, EX REL. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY
AND SCHOOL LANDS, PETITIONER

82-132

v.

JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
ETAL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1983]
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA),t the United
. States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sover-

-

'Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176, codified at 28
U. S. C. § 2409a, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f), and 28 U. S. C. § 1402(d).
The provision relevant to the present case, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, state:
(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which
the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or
water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian
lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which may be or could have
been brought under sections 1346, 1347, 1491, or 2410 of this title, sections
7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26
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eign immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a
party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving .real property in which the United States claims an
interest. These cases present two separate issues concerning the QTA. The first is whether Congress intended the
QTA to provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant
can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real
property. The second is whether the QTA's twelve-year
statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(f), is applicable in
U. S. C. 7424, 7425, and 7426), or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952 (43
u. s. c. 666).
(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any
real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judgment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and
if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United
States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person
determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election
the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or control.
(c) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right,
title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest
claimed by the United States.
(d) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court,
the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of
the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority confered by section 1346(f) of this title.
(e) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried
by the court without a jury.
(f) Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twel~ years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United
States.
(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the
United States based upon adverse possession.
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instances where the plaintiff is a State, such as respondent
North Dakota. We conclude that the QTA forecloses the
other bases for relief urged by the State, and that the limitations provision is as fully applicable to North Dakota as it is
to all others who sue under the QTA.
I
It is undisputed that under the equal footing doctrine first
set forth in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845),
North Dakota, like other States, became the owner of the
beds of"'ilaVigable streams in the Stafebponit'S'"aamiSsion to
theumoll.' Ii1salsoagreed that under the law of North Dakota, a riparian owner has title to the middle of the bed of a
non-navigable stream. Because of differing views of navigab~, the United States a~rth b lttttmr a"sse'ff competing
c aims to title to certain portions of the bed of the Little Missouri River within North Dakota. The United States contends that the river is not now and never has been navigable,
and it claims most of the disputed area based on its status as
riparian landowner. 2 North Dakota, on the other hand, asserts that the river was navigable on October 1, 1889, the
date North Dakota attained statehood, and therefore that
title to the disputed bed vested in it under the equal footing
doctrine on that date. Since at least 1955, the United States
has been issuing riverbed oil and gas leases to private
entities.
Seeking to resolve this dispute as to ownership of the riverbed, North Dakota filed this suit in the District Court
against several federal officials. 3 The State's complaint re2
In some parts of the disputed areas, the United States' claim to the
bed is founded on reasons other than its status as riparian landowner. See
Tr. 38-48.
3
The complaint named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the United States Bureau of Land
Management, and the Chief of the United States Forest Service. App. 6.
The defendants were alleged to have "final authority" over the agencies

' .
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quested injunctive and mandamus relief directing the defendants to "cease and desist from develop[ing] or otherwise exercising privileges of ownership upon the bed of the Little
Missouri River within the State of North Dakota," and it further sought a declaratory judgment "[d]eclaring the Little
Missouri River to be a navigable river for the purpose of
determining ownership of the bed." App. 9. As the jurisdictional basis for its suit, North Dakota invoked 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331 (federal question); 28 U. S. C. § 1361 (mandamus); 28
U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202 (declaratory judgment and further relief) and 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706 (the judicial review provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551 et
seq.). App. 6. North Dakota's original complaint did not
mention the QTA. However, the District Court required
the State to amend its complaint to recite a claim thereunder.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-16a. The State complied and filed
an amended complaint. App. 13--16. 4
The matter thereafter proceeded to trial. North Dakota
introduced evidence in support of its claim that the river was
navigable on the date of statehood. 5 The federal defendants, while denying navigability, presented no evidence on
this point; 6 their evidence was limited to showing, for statute
of limitations purposes, that the State had notice of the
that were "presently unlawfully asserting ownership over sovereign lands
of the State of North Dakota." App. 7.
' North Dakota's amended complaint did not name the United States as
a party defendant, even though the United States appears to be the only
proper federal defendant under 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(a). The Solicitor General has expressly waived any objection the United States or the defendants might have as to this point. Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 20.
6
North Dakota's cas~ consisted of documentary evidence of canoe travel
on the river prior to statehood, an effort to float logs down the river shortly
after statehood, present-day recreational canoe traffic, and other small
craft usage over the years.
·
6
The federal defendants took the position that the State's evidence of
navigability was so weak that it actually supported the view that the river
was non-navigable.
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United States' claim more than twelve years prior to the
commencement of th~uit.
After trial, the \District Court rendered judgment for
North Dakota. The court first concludeaffiatme L"ittteMissouri River was navigable in 1889 and that North Dakota attained title t~ehood under the equal footing
doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1311(a). 506 F. Supp. 619, 622-624 (D. N.D. 1981). Then,
applying what it deemed to be an accepted rule of construction that statutes of limitations do not apply to sovereigns unless a contrary legislative intention is clearly evident from
the express language of the statute or otherwise, the court
rejected the defendants' claim that North Dakota's suit was
barred by the QTA's twelve-year statute of limitations, 28
U.S. C. §2409a(f). 506 F. Supp., at 625--626. 7 The District Court accordingly entered judgment quieting North Dakota's title to the bed of the river. App. to Pet. for Cert.
29a-30a. 8 The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects.
671 F. 2d 271 (CAS 1 ~
The defendants' petition for certiorari, which we granted,

-

7
To further support this conclusion, the court stated, albeit without
elaboration, that the legislative history of the QTA showed that Congress
intended the statute of limitations "to apply exclusively to persons, be they
private citizens or public or private corporations." 506 F. Supp. 619, 625
(D. N.D. 1981). The court also commented that the federal defendants'
position was contrary to the express will of Congress, as indicated by the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 131l(a). 506 F. Supp., at 626.
The defendants also argued in the Bistrict Court that the United States
had acquired title to the bed by adverse possession, and that, in any event,
the suit was barred by laches. The District Court rejected both of these
contentions, 506 F. Supp., at 624-626, and the defendants did not pursue
them further.
•
8
The judgment excluded those portions of the bed in which the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation had an interest. The
Tribes were not named as parties to the State's suit, and the court concluded that their rights should be left unaffected by the judgment. 506
F. Supp., at 622.

1.)-.c::..-
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- - U. S. - - (1982), challenged only the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the QTA's statute of limitations is inapplicable to States. North Dakota filed a conditional cross-petition, No. 82-132, asserting that even if its suit under the QTA
is barred by§ 2409a(f), the judgment below is still correct because the QTA remedy is not exclusive and its suit against
the federal officers is still maintainable wholly aside from the
QTA. This submission, which the Court of Appeals did not
find it necessary to address, is also urged by the State, as respondent in No. 81-2337, as a ground for affirming the judgment in its favor. See United States v. New York Telephone
Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). We now grant
the cross-petition, which heretofore has remained pending,
and we first address the question presented by it.
II
The states of the Union, like all other entities, are barred
by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States
in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress. California v. Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 61-62 (1979);
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 387 (1939); Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 342 (1907). Only upon
passage of the QTA did the United States waive its immunity
with respect to suits involving title to land. Prior to 1972,
States and all others asserting title to land claimed by the
United States had only limited means of obtaining a resolution of the. title dispute-they could attempt to induce the
United States to file a quiet title action against them, or they
could petition Congress or the Executive for discretionary relief. Also, since passa,ge of the Tucker Act in 1887, those
claimants willing to settle for monetary damages rather than
title to the disputed land could sue in the Court of Claims and
attempt to make out a constitutional claim for just compensation. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491; Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S.
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643, 647 n. 8 (1962).
Enterprising claimants also pressed the so-called "officer's
suit" as another possible means of obtaining relief in a title
dispute with the Federal Government. In the typical officer's suit involving a title dispute, the claimant would proceed against the federal officials charged with supervision of
the disputed area, rather than against the United States.
The suit would be in ejectment or, as here, for an injunction
or a writ of mandamus forbidding the defendant officials from
interfering with the claimant's property rights.
As a device for circumventing federal sovereign immunity
in land title disputes, the officer's suit ultimately did not
prove to be successful. This Court appeared to accept the
device in early cases. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S.
196 (1882); Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 9 Cranch 11 (1815).
Later cases, however, were inconsistent; some held that such
suits were barred by sovereign immunity, while others did
not, and "it is fair to say that to reconcile completely all the
decisions of the Court in this field . . . would be a Procrustean task." Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646 (1962).
Compare, e. g., the cases cited id., at 646, n. 6, with those
cited id., at 646, n. 7.
In Malone, the court cut through the tangle of the previous
decisions and applied to land disputes the rule announced in
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949):
"the action of a federal officer affecting property claimed
by a plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific
relief against the officer as an individual only if the officer's action is 'not within the officer's statutory powers
or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in -the particular case, are constitutionally
void."' Malone, supra, at 647 (quoting Larson, supra,
at 702).
The Larson-Malone test plainly made it more difficult for a

I
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plaintiff to employ a suit against federal officers as a vehicle
for resolving a title dispute with the United States. Thus, in
the decade after Malone, claimants having disputes with the
United States over real property met with little success in
most courts. 9
Against this background, Congress considered and passed
the QTA in 1972. At a hearing on the bill, the officer's-suit
possibility was called to the attention of Congress. 10 The
predominant view, however, was that citizens asserting title
to or the right to possession of lands claimed by the United
States were "without benefit of a recourse to the courts," because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 11
Congress sought to rectify this state of affairs. The original version of S. 216, the bill that became the QTA, was short
and simple. Its substantive provision provided for no qualifications whatsoever. It stated in its entirety: "The United
States may be named a party in any civil action brought by
any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United
States." 117 Gong. Rec. 46380 (1971). The Executive
Branch opposed the original version of S. 216 and proposed,
in its stead, a more-elaborate bill, reprinted in S. Rep.
9
See, e. g., County of Bonner v. Anderson, 439 F. 2d 764 (CA9 1971);
Simson v. Vinson, 394 F. 2d 732 (CA5), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 968 (1968);
Gardner v. Harris, 391 F. 2d 885 (CA5 1968); Switzerland Co. v. Udall,
337 F. 2d 56 (CA4 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 914 (1965). One court of
appeals, however, construed Malone narrowly. See Armstrong v. Udall,
435 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA9 1970); Andros v. Rupp, 433 F. 2d 70, 73-74 (CA9
1970) (holding Malone to be inapplicable where the plaintiff has record title
to the disputed land).
10
See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate
Comm. on Interior l\Pd Insular Affairs on S. 216, S. 579, and S. 721, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 64 (1971) (statement of Prof. J. Steadman); id., at 81
(letter from L. Gendron, Esq.).
"S. Rep. No. 92-575, p. 1 (1971). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559,
p. 6 (1972); id., at 9 (letter from the Attorney General); Hearing, supra
note 10, at 8 (Sen. Church); id., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept. of the
Interior); id., at 45 (letter from Sen. Hansen); id., at 55 (T. McKnight); id.,
at 74 (letter from R. Reynolds); id., at 77 (statement ofT. Cavanaugh) .
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92-575, pp. 7-8 (1971), providing several "appropriate safegu~ds for the protection of the public interest." 12
1/l'his Executive proposal, made by the Justice Department,
limited the waiver of sovereign immunity in several important respects. First, it excluded Indian lands from the scope
of the waiver. The Executive branch felt that a waiver of
immunity in this area would not be consistent with "specific
commitments" it had made to the Indians through treaties
and other agreements. 13 Second, in order to insure that the
waiver would not "serve to disrupt costly ongoing Federal
programs that involve the disputed lands," the proposal allowed the United States the option of paying money damages
instead of surrendering the property if it lost a case on the
merits. 14 Third, the Justice Department proposal provided
that the legislation would have prospective effect only; that
is, it would not apply to claims that accrued prior to the date
of enactment. This was deemed necessary so that the workload of the Justice Department and the courts could develop
at a rate which could be absorbed. 15 Fourth, to ensure that
stale claims would not be opened up to litigation, 16 the proposed bill included a six-year statute of limitations. 17
The Senate accepted the Justice Department's proposal,
with the notable exception of the provision that would have
given the bill prospective effect only. The Senate-passed
12
Hearing, supra note 10, at 21 (S. Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General); see id. at 32 (J. McGuire, Dept. of Agriculture).
13
!d., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept. of the Interior).
14
Ibid. See also id., at 3, 32 (views of Dept. of Agriculture); S. Rep.
No. 92-575, pp. 5-6 (1971) (letter from the Attorney General).
16
!d. , at 7 (letter from the Attorney General).
16
H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney
General).
17
The Justice Department proposal contained other, relatively minor
limitations on the waiver. For example, it expressly stated that no one
could claim against the United States by adverse possession, and it provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction. All of these changes were ultimately included in the legislation .
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version of the bill contained a "grandfather clause" that
would have allowed old claims to be asserted for two years
after the bill became law. 18
Primarily because of the grandfather clause, the Executive
Branch could still not accept the bill. The Department of
Justice argued that this clause could cause "a flood of litigation on old claims, many of which had already been submitted
to the Congress and rejected," thereby putting "an undue
burden on the Department and the courts." 19 As a compromise, the Department proposed to give up its insistence on
"prospective only" language and to accept an increase in the
statute of limitations to twelve years, in exchange for elimination of the grandfather clause. 20 This proposal had the effect of making the bill retroactive for a twelve-year period.
The House included this compromise in the version of the bill
passed by it, and the Senate acquiesced and the bill became
law with the compromise language intact.
In light of this legislative history, we need not be detained
long by North mteota's contention that it can avoid the
QTA's statute of limitations and other restrictions by the device of an officer's suit. If North Dakota's position were correct, all of the carefully-crafted provisions of the QTA
deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest could be averted. "It would require the suspension of
disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful
18
This provision stated that an action would be barred unless an action
was begun "within six years after the claim for relief first accrues or within
two years after the effective date of this Act, whichever is later." 117
Cong. Rec. 46380 (1971) (emphasis added).
19
H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney
General).
20
Id., at 7-8. The Department of Justice also objected to a provision in
the Senate-passed version that would have made the limitations period begin to run only on the date that the United States obtained actual knowledge of the claim. The Department contended that the limitations period
should begin to run on the date the claimant knew or should have known of
the United States' claim, see ibid., and Congress agreed to this change.
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and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful
pleading." Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833 (1976).
If we were to allow claimants to try the federal government's title to land under an officer's-suit theory, the Indian
lands exception to the QTA would be rendered nugatory.
The United States could also be dispossessed of the disputed
property without being afforded the option of paying damages, thereby thwarting the congressional intent to avoid disruptions of costly federal activities. Finally, and most relevantly to the present case, the QTA's twelve-year statute of
limitations, the one point on which the Executive Branch was
most insistent, could be avoided, and, contrary to the wish of
Congress, an unlimited number of suits involving stale claims
might be instituted.
v13rown v. GSA, supra, is instructive here. In that case,
we held that§ 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-16, was the exclusive remedy for federal employment
discrimination.
There, as here, it was "problematic"
whether any judicial relief at all was available prior to passage of the Act; the prevailing congressional view was that
there was none. 425 U. S., at 826--828. There, as here, the
"balance, completeness, and structural integrity" of the statute belied the contention that it "was designed merely to supplement other judicial relief." I d., at 832. Thus, we applied
the rule that a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts
more general remedies. I d., at 834. 21 That rule is equally
applicable in the present context.
Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether,
prior to 1972, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., supra,
and Malone v. Bawdoin, supra, would have permitted an officer's suit to be maintained under the present circum21
See also Great American Fed. S . & L . Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S.
366, 375--377 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U. S. 475, 488-490 (1973);
United States v. Demko, 385 U. S. 149, 151-152 (1966); 1A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23.16 (4th ed. 1972).

'
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stances. 22 w@,hat Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could
challenge ~ates' title to real property.

III
We also cannot agree with North Dakota's submission,
which was accepted by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals, that the States are not subject to the operation of
§ 2409a(f). This issue is purely one of statutory interpretation, and we find no support for North Dakota's position in
either the plain statutory language or the legislative history.
The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the
United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of
Congress. A necessary corollary of this rule is that when
Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be
strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly
implied. See, e. g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156,
160-161 (1981); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111,
117-118 (1979); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967);
· Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957); United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 591 (1941). When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immuWe also reject North Dakota's claim that, even if the QTA preempted
alternatives remedies in 1972, Congress created a new supplemental remedy four years later when it amended 5 U. S. C. § 702 with Pub. L. No.
94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). That statute waived federal sovereign immunity for suits against federal officers in which the plaintiff seeks relief
other than money damages, but it specifically confers no "authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the-relief which is sought." The QTA is such an "other
statute," because, if a suit is untimely under the QTA, the QTA expressly
"forbids the relief" which would be sought under§ 702. See H. Rep. No.
94-1656, p. 13 (1976) (§ 702 provides no authority to grant relief "when
Congress has dealt in particularity with a claim and [has] intended a specified remedy to be the exclusive remedy").
22
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nity. Accordingly, although we should not construe such a
time-bar provision unduly narrowly, we must be careful not
to interpret it in a manner that would "extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended." United States v. Kubrick, supra, at 117-118 (citing Soriano v. United States,
supra; Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61
(1955)). Accordingly, before finding that Congress intended
here to exempt the States from satisfying the time-bar condition on its waiver of immunity, we should insist on some clear
indication of such an intention.
Proceeding in accordance with these well-established principles, we observe that § 2409a(f) expressly states that any
civil action is time-barred unless filed within twelve years
after the date it accrued. The statutory language makes no
exception for civil actions by States. Nor is there any evidence in the legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to exempt the State from the condition attached to
the immunity waiver. 23 These facts alone, in the light of our
approach to sovereign immunity cases, would appear to compel the conclusion that States are not entitled to an exemption from the strictures of§ 2409a(f).
The State, however, relies on the well-known canon of
statutory construction that "[s]tatutes of limitations are not
... held to embrace the state, unless she is expressly designated, or necessarily included by the nature of the mischiefs
to be remedied." Weber v. Board of Harbor Commissioners,
18 Wall. 57, 70 (1873). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Recognizing that no express legislative history supports its position,
North Dakota relies on congressional silence. As did the Court of Appeals, 671 F . 2d 271,. 274-275 (CA8 1982), North Dakota notes the references in the House committee report, H. R. Rep. No. 92-1558 (1972), to
"persons," "citizens," and "individual citizens," and the absence of any references to "states." However, to the extent that such general language
has any relevance at all, the report also refers to "plaintiff[s)," "owners of
adjacent property," "land owner[s]," and "claimants"-all terms that can
easily encompass States. See also S. Rep. No. 92-575 (1971).
23
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United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132-133 (1938).

Because

§ 2409a(f) does not expressly include the State, North Dakota

urges, and the Court of Appeals held, that the State was not
barred by the statute. While recognizing that immunity
waivers by the United States are to be carefully construed,
the Court of Appeals concluded that precedence should be
given to the competing canon of statutory construction that
statutes of limitations should not apply to the States absent
express legislative inclusion. 671 F. 2d, at 275-276.
We do not agree. In fashioning sovereign-immunity
waiver legislation, Congress is certainly free to exempt the
States from a statute of limitations or any other condition of
the waiver. But there is no merit to North Dakota's assertion that a condition on a congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity should be regarded as inapplicable to States
in the absence of express intent to the contrary. This Court
has never sanctioned such a rule. Quite the contrary, in
United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182 (1888), the Court
held that a general statute of limitations, one that did not expressly mention States, barred a State's claim against the
Federal Government. And in Minnesota v. United States,
supra, at 388--389, where the United States had waived its
immunity on the condition that any suit against it had to
brought in a federal court, we concluded without hesitation
that the plaintiff State's suit should have been dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, because it had been filed in state court.
Thus, neither Congress nor the decisions of this Court have
suggested that the States are exempt from satisfying the
conditions placed by Congress on its immunity waivers; and,
in light of our Constitution, which makes the federal law ultimately supreme, these holdings should not have been
surprising.
We do not discount the importance of the generally applicable rule of statutory construction relied upon by the Court
of Appeals. The judicially-created rule that a sovereign is
normally exempt from the operation of a generally-worded
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statute of limitations has retained its vigor because it serves
the public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues,
and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public
officers. Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, supra, at 132.
Thus, in this case, the rule would further the interests of the
citizens of North Dakota, by affording them some protection
against the negligence of state officials in failing to comply
with the otherwise applicable statute of limitations.
As we have said, however, we must follow the will of Congress. As the legislative history outlined in Part II above
shows, Congress agreed with the Executive that § 2409a(f)
was necessary for protection of national public interests. In
general, a suit by a State against the United States affects
the congressionally-recognized national public interests to
the same degree as does a suit by a private entity. Therefore, the judge-created rule designed to protect the interests
of the citizens of one particular State must yield in the face of
the evidence that Congress has determined that the national
interest requires a contrary rule. We are convinced that
Congress had no intention of exempting the States from compliance with § 2409a(f). That section must be applied to the
States because they are "necessarily included by the nature
of the mischiefs to be remedied." Weber v. Board of Harbor
Commissioners, supra, at 70. We thus conclude that States
must fully adhere to the requirements of § 2409a(f) when suing the United States under the QTA.
IV
North Dakota finally argues that, even if Congress intended to apply § 2409a(f) to it, and even if valid when applied
in suits relating to other kinds of land, the section is
unconstititional under the equal footing doctrine and the
Tenth Amendment insofar as it purports to bar claims to
lands constitutionally vested in the State. We are unable to
agree.
The State probably is correct in stating that Congress

,.,t"•
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could not, without making provision for payment of compensation, pass a law depriving a State of land vested in it by
the Constitution. Such a law would not run afoul of the
equal footing doctrine or the Tenth Amendment, as asserted
by North Dakota, but it would constitute a taking of the
State's property without just compensation, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. 24 Section 2409a(f), however, does not
purport to strip any State, or anyone else for that matter, of (
any property rights. The statute limits the time in which a
quiet title suit against the United States can be filed; but, unlike an adverse possession provision, § 2409a(f) does not purport to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to
a disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to
quiet his title is deemed time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dismissal pursuant to § 2409a(f) does not quiet title to the property in the United States. The title dispute remains unresolved. 25 Nothing prevents the claimant from continuing to
assert his title, in hope of inducing the United States to file
its own quiet title suit, in which the matter would finally be
put to rest on the merits. 26
24
The United States can, of course, exercise its eminent domain power
to take title to State property. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F . Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534 (1941). See also United States v. Carmack,
329 u. s. 230, 23~242 (1946).
25
This discussion also answers the argument that our holding conflicts
with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. § 1311, which confirmed in the States title to lands beneath navigable waters within their
boundaries. If the river is navigable, the land in question belongs to
North Dakota, in accordance with the Constitution and the Submerged
Lands Act, regarpless of whether North Dakota's suit to quiet its title is
time-barred under§ 2409a(f).
26
Whether, in the absence of a suit by it, the United States would ever
acquire good title to the disputed area would, under the present status of
the law, be strictly a matter of State law. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p.
10 (1972) (letter from the Attorney General) ("The State law of real property would of course apply to decide all questions not covered by Federal
law."). In many instances, the United States would presumably eventu-
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Thus, we see no constitutional infirmity in § 2409a(f). A
cause of action grounded on a constitutional claim can become
time-barred just as any other claim can. See, e. g., Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980); Soriano v. United
States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957). Nothing in the Constitution requires otherwise.

v

Admittedly, North Dakota comes before us with an appealing case. Both lower courts held that the Little Misouri is
navigable and that the State obtained title to the disputed
land at statehood. The federal defendants have not asked
this Court to review the correctness of these substantive
holdings other than to submit that these determinations are
time-barred by the QTA. 'fl We agree with this submission.
Whatever the merits of the title dispute may be, the federal
defendants are correct: If North Dakota's suit is barred by
§ 2409a(f), the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into
the merits.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. North Dakota's action may proceed, if at
all, only under the QTA. If the State's suit was filed more
than twelve years after its action accrued, the suit is barred
by § 2409a(f). Since the lower courts made no findings as to
the date on which North Dakota's suit accrued, the case must
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
ally take the land by adverse possession, but, if so, it would be purely by
the virtue of State law. Here, North Dakota asserts that the disputed
land is public trust land that cannot ever be taken by adverse possession
under North Dakota"iaw.
27
The federal defendants stress that the United States still disputes the
lower courts' conclusion that the Little Missouri River is navigable. They
state that they did not seek review of that finding in this Court only because they deemed it inappropriate to burden this Court with this purely
factual issue. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. See Sup. Ct. Rule 17.
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right to sue~ it did not cut off any pre-existing rights.
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